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ABSTRACT An insulin pump is a small wearable medical gadget which can mimic the way a healthy
pancreas functions by providing continuous subcutaneous insulin infusion for the patient. However, in the
current products, the access to the pump is not securely controlled, rendering the pump insecure to harmful
or even lethal attacks, such as those that lead to the privacy breach of the patient and the delivery of abnormal
dosage of insulin to the patient. In a conventional symmetric key-based security solution, how to distribute
and manage the key is quite challenging, since the patient bearing an insulin pump may visit any hospital
or clinic to receive treatment from any qualified doctor. In order to prevent malicious access to the pump,
in this paper, we propose a Fingerprint-based Insulin Pump security (FIPsec) scheme which requires an
entity to first pass the fingerprint authentication process before it is allowed to access the insulin pump.
With this scheme, the request from an adversary to access the pump will be blocked thereby protecting
the pump from the possibility of being subjected to serious attacks during the post-request period. In the
scheme, a cancelable Delaunay triangle-based fingerprint matching algorithm is proposed for the insulin
pump, which has capabilities to resist against nonlinear fingerprint image distortion and the influence of
missing or spurious minutiae. In order to evaluate the performance of the proposed fingerprint matching
algorithm, we perform comprehensive experiments on FVC2002 DB1 and DB2 fingerprint databases. The
results show that the FIPsec scheme can achieve a reasonably low equal error rate and thus becomes a viable
solution to thwarting unauthorized access to the insulin pump.
INDEX TERMS Biomedical informatics, wearable sensors, implantable biomedical devices, insulin pump
system, artificial pancreas, cyber security, authentication, access control.
I. INTRODUCTION
An insulin pump is a small medical gadget which can be
easily carried on the body of a patient with diabetes, e.g., on a
belt, inside a pocket, or even attached to a bra [1]–[3]. In other
words, it facilitates a discreet therapy service that is conve-
nient for these patients. Insulin delivery with pumps, also
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Ilsun You.
known as continuous subcutaneous insulin infusion (CSII),
can mimic the way a healthy pancreas functions and deliver
precise doses of rapid-acting insulin 24 hours a day to closely
match the physiological demands of the body [4], [5]. A typ-
ical Insulin Pump System (IPS) is composed of a Continuous
Glucose Monitor (CGM), an insulin pump and an infusion
set. The CGM can provide real-time glucose readings to the
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Nonetheless, the current IPS lacks sufficient security
mechanisms to protect the patients from malicious attacks.
In particular, the access to the pump does not have to pass
any rigorous authentication process, which render the patient
insecure to many harmful or lethal attacks [6], [7]. Firstly,
adversaries can gain access to the sensitive information stored
in the pump, including the patient’s personal information
(name, age, ID, contact number, etc.) and related medi-
cal information (insulin infusion recordings, insulin delivery
configurations, etc.). Furthermore, this illegal access to the
pump can even modify the therapy related settings in the
pump, triggering the pump to deliver abnormal dosage of
insulin to the patient. The overdosage of insulin can result
in low blood glucose levels in the patient’s blood thereby
causing hypoglycemia which may lead to dizziness, seizures,
loss of consciousness or even death. In contrast, the under-
dosage of insulin can cause abnormally high blood glucose
level in the blood, leading to a condition called hyperglycemia
that can be fatal to the patient. For patient’s safety reasons,
the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) requires the
IPS to have preset minimum and maximum dosage and infu-
sion rate settings in the pump. Nevertheless, these settings
could be tampered with by attackers via the wireless link.
As demonstrated by Barnaby Jack [8], with customized radio
equipment and software, the attacker can seize control of
any insulin pump within a radius of 300 feet and subject the
pump to unauthorized commands such as dispensing its entire
reservoir of insulin to the patient. A conventional symmet-
ric key based security solution, in which the key has to be
deployed beforehand, is not viable here. This is because a
patient bearing an IPS may need to visit any hospital or clinic
for treatment, especially in a medical emergency scenario.
It is quite challenging to distribute the key to the very hospital
or clinic in a timely manner and manage the key securely
thereafter [9], [10].
In order to safeguard the therapy related settings in the
insulin pump, Hei et al. [6] proposed a personalized patient
infusion pattern-based access control (PIPAC) scheme in
which supervised learning approaches are employed to learn
the insulin infusion patterns by performing training on infu-
sion logs in the pump. Any attack which aims to deliver
abnormal dosage of insulin to the patient will not fit into
the pattern and can be easily be detected. However, the main
purpose of the PIPAC scheme is to simply detect the abnormal
dosage infusion and not to suggest any remedial measures.
In this paper, we propose a Fingerprint based Insulin Pump
security (FIPsec) scheme which applies the fingerprint based
authentication technique to control the direct access to the
pump. With this scheme, users who want to change the
parameter settings in the pump have to be authenticated first
by using the patient’s finger biometrics. Any attacker who
wants to configure the pump maliciously will be blocked
from accessing it effectively. These configurations include
changing basal rates and bolus dosage settings in the pump.
This authentication requirement also protects information
privacy of the data stored in the pump as only legitimate users
can pass the fingerprint authentication, and retrieve and read
information. The contributions of the paper are summarized
below:
• We analyze the security design challenges for the
IPS and present the design of the FIPsec scheme in
Section II. Through the use of this scheme, any access
to the insulin pump must first undergo a verification
process which involves the use of the patient’s finger.
• We propose an improved cancelable Delaunay triangle-
based fingerprint matching algorithm to implement the
FIPsec scheme in Section III. This matching algorithm
is designed to protect the biometric template stored in
the pump, resist against nonlinear fingerprint distortion
and conserve pump resources.
• We conduct extensive experiments to evaluate the per-
formance of the proposed fingerprint matching algo-
rithm in Section IV. Results show that the improvement
to the algorithm by reducing the size of query features
does not affect the overall matching performance, and at
the same time it helps to conserve the resources in the
pump remarkably.
Section V analyzes the security performance of the FIPsec
scheme while Section VI discusses related research progress
in this area. The final section summarizes our research with
concluding remarks.
II. FIPSEC SCHEME DESIGN
This section analyzes the security design challenges for the
IPS and then presents the design of the FIPsec scheme which
can support the fingerprint based IPS security solutions.
A. THREAT MODELING
Threat modeling is the prerequisite for designing a security
scheme. Generally the threats facing an IPS can be catego-
rized into two main classes:
FIGURE 1. An insulin pump system (IPS) which is composed of a
continuous glucose monitor (CGM), an insulin pump and an infusion set.
1) PASSIVE EAVESDROPPERS
A passive eavesdropper wiretaps the wireless channel in an
insulin pump system and captures sensitive information of the
patient which may contain the patient’s ID, contact number,
glucose levels, etc. As shown in Fig. 1, real-time glucose
readings could be leaked from the wireless channel between
the continuous glucose monitor and the pump. Meanwhile,
eavesdroppers could obtain the patient’s personal information
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and pump configurations from the wireless channel between
the pump and the external USB device.
2) ACTIVE ADVERSARIES
Active adversaries have capabilities to launch attacks on the
IPS actively. They can obtain the patient’s personal infor-
mation by having access to the pump directly. This access
may even allow the adversaries to make malicious changes to
the pump settings, leading to overdosage or underdosage of
insulin injection to the patient. Both overdosage and under-
dosage of insulin injection are lethal to the patient.
The active adversaries are more harmful to the patient
than passive eavesdroppers. The FIPsec scheme proposed in
this paper has the capability to control access to the pump
so that the active attacks which target at changing injection
settings in the pump are to be blocked from accessing it.
Meanwhile, a fingerprint authentication system is vulnerable
to presentation attacks where an artificial replica of the user’s
fingerprint can be used to spoof the system. This type of
attacks can be countered by using various liveness detection
methods. However, considering the restriction of resources in
the pump, the liveness detection function is not adopted in our
FIPsec scheme design.
B. SECURITY DESIGN CHALLENGES
There are three major components in an insulin pump system:
a CGM, an insulin pump and an infusion set, as shown
in Fig. 1. The function of each component and how they
mutually interact are described below.
• CGM and transmitter: The CGM measures the glucose
levels on a continual basis via an indwelling subcuta-
neous sensor. It then transmits the glucose data wire-
lessly to the insulin pump unit via a transmitter.
• Insulin pump: The insulin pump has a reservoir which
stores insulin. Depending on the patient’s current glu-
cose levels, the required dosage of insulin is infused
into the patient’s body. It receives and displays near-
continuous glucose readings from the CGM.
• Wireless link: The wireless link between the CGM and
the insulin pump is responsible for transmitting the glu-
cose values from the CGM to the pump.
• USB device: An extra USB device (e.g., the CareLink
USB from the Medtronic Inc.) is used to configure the
pump settings. A doctor uses a computer and the USB
to upload the settings to the pump wirelessly.
The pump delivers insulin in two modes: basal rate and
bolus dose. With the basal rate, the pump delivers a small
amount of insulin continuously. Meanwhile, when the patient
is going to have meals or needs to correct high blood glucose
levels, a bolus dose of insulin can be configured by the patient
and injected into his/her body.
Compared to traditional information technology systems,
there are significant challenges in the IPS security design
which stem from its life-saving medical application require-
ments, limited resources for wireless communications and
user-friendly interface and operations [11], [12], each of
which is discussed below.
• Medical applications: The security design for the IPS
has to achieve a trade-off between security and medi-
cal safety. Any security scheme for the IPS should not
hinder its medical applications, such as delivering the
precise dose of insulin to a patient’s body in a timely
manner. If a password is applied to control the access
to the insulin pump, then remembering and entering
the password is required whenever the patient wants to
change his/her insulin pump settings. Using the pass-
word is not convenient and remembering it would be
very challenging and cumbersome, especially for elderly
patients or someone with mental issues.
• Limited resources: The IPS has limited resources in
the CGM and the pump itself. There is a transmitter
in the CGM to send the glucose readings to the pump
wirelessly. Ideally, confidentiality and integrity could
be achieved if the glucose data could be encrypted and
its message digest be calculated and appended to the
message before transmission. However, these additional
security mechanisms will place an unacceptably heavy
burden on the tiny CGM module and thus are not viable
from a practical perspective. The insulin pump is also
an embedded system and powered by a battery. So, any
security scheme designed to run on the pump should be
energy efficient.
• Usability:Abasic requirement for a medical device such
as the IPS is that any proposed security mechanism to
safeguard it must be easy to operate with and must work
in a correct, safe and timely manner with no room for
errors. Many strong and robust security solutions that
require the usage of complicated passwords/operations
are not viable in this scenario.
In summary, the IPS has unique characteristics, e.g., tiny
and wireless devices, live-saving applications, extremely lim-
ited resources and special usability requirements, which pose
great challenges to its security design. The security issues
of the IPS need to be addressed urgently since any data
tampering by adversaries could be life-threateningwith a fatal
consequence to the patients.
C. FIPSEC SCHEME DESIGN
In order to address these design challenges, in this section,
we propose a Fingerprint based Insulin Pump security
(FIPsec) scheme. This FIPsec hardware needs a fingerprint
scanning sensor with a corresponding fingerprint processing
algorithm to be added to the existing IPS hardware. Similar to
most of the other fingerprint design schemes popularly used
in mobile phones, this fingerprint scanner could be integrated
with the round button on the surface of the pump (in Fig. 1)
or by using a separate chip processing the fingerprint.
The FIPsec scheme applies a fingerprint-based authentica-
tion technique to control the access to the insulin pump. Dif-
ferent fingerprint matching approaches can be adopted in the
authentication process, such as image correlation [13], [14],
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phase matching [15], skeleton matching [16] and minutiae
matching [17]. Because of successful use records in forensic
examinations and storage efficiency in embedded computing
systems,minutiae representation-basedmatching has become
the most widely used one [17] and is also chosen in our
FIPsec scheme. The scheme includes two phases: the enroll-
ment phase and the authentication phase, which are detailed
below.
• In the enrollment phase, the patient’s fingerprint tem-
plate is registered in the IPS for use in the authentication
phase. A good quality fingerprint image is captured by
using a fingerprint scanning sensor and then is used
to extract minutiae points. Fingerprint minutiae, includ-
ing ridge endings and ridge bifurcations, are the major
features of a fingerprint image. The minutiae are later
used to construct a template with refined discriminatory
features/structures. This template is stored in the mem-
ory of the pump. The enrollment process is performed
initially when an IPS is being configured for use for each
patient. It can be processed once and used in the IPS until
the end of the IPS lifetime.
• In the authentication phase, fingerprint query is gener-
ated and compared against the template stored in the
pump. A matching score is calculated to determine
the similarity level between the query and the tem-
plate. If the score is larger than a pre-defined threshold,
the authentication is deemed to be successful and the
access to the pump is granted. Otherwise, the access
request is rejected. In this phase, the patient’s fingerprint
image is captured and processed by using the same pro-
cessing algorithm as the one being used in the enrollment
phase.
When applying the FIPsec scheme, functions and com-
ponents that need to be added to an existing insulin pump
include (a) a fingerprint scanner, (b) a fingerprint image
processing and minutiae extraction function, (c) a fingerprint
feature representation and cancelable transformation func-
tion, (d) a fingerprint matching function to compare the query
against the template and (e) a fingerprint template stored in
the memory of the insulin pump.
Two fingers from each patient can be registered in his/her
IPS profile: one as the primary and the other as the secondary.
If the primary one cannot be used for authentication because
of some reasons (e.g., hurt, burnt), the patient can use his/her
secondary finger to access the insulin pump.
With the FIPsec scheme, whenever the critical settings of
the insulin pump is to be changed, e.g., increasing or reducing
the basal insulin or configuring the bolus dose of insulin,
it requires the patient to authenticate to the pump by using
the prescribed fingerprint authentication procedure.
III. FINGERPRINT AUTHENTICATION ALGORITHM
The FIPsec scheme could be implemented by using various
fingerprint authentication algorithms. Some of these algo-
rithms have a high level matching performance. For instance,
the state-of-the-art Minutia Cylinder-Code (MCC)-based
algorithm can achieve an equal error rate of below 2%
on FVC2006 DB2 [18]. However, the construction of a
local structure (a cylinder) is complex and consumes sig-
nificant amount of resources. Considering that the insulin
pump is a wireless mobile system with limited resources,
a triangle-based feature representation is selected in the
scheme design where features are constructed from minutiae
triplets [19], [20]. In this section, a Delaunay triangulation
process is applied to triangulate the minutiae on a finger-
print as it has capabilities to tackle nonlinear fingerprint
image distortion andmissing or spurious minutiae influences.
A cancelable feature is added into the scheme in order to
protect the fingerprint template stored in the IPS which can
be revoked if it is disclosed by adversaries.
FIGURE 2. The fingerprint verification algorithm using cancelable
Delaunay triangulation based feature representations. User’s PIN is used
to generate cancelable fingerprint templates for use.
A. FINGERPRINT VERIFICATION PROCESS
The Delaunay triangulation based fingerprint verification
method is shown in Fig. 2, with each step described below:
• Delaunay triangle-based feature representation: This
step in Fig. 2 includes processes of image pre-
processing, minutiae extraction, Voronoi partitioning,
Delaunay triangulation and feature representation. After
this step, the fingerprint image is represented as triangle
features which are suitable for the automatic matching
process.
• Cancelable transformation: This step transforms trian-
gle features to generate cancelable fingerprint templates
by using one-way transformation function in the feature
domain. The cancelable fingerprint template is used
to protect the patient’s biometrics which are stored in
the medical device. With the cancelable transformation,
if the fingerprint template is compromised, a new tem-
plate can be generated by using a new transformation
function.
• Fingerprint matching: The matching step compares
query features against the template features in the IPS to
decide whether the access to the IPS is allowed or not.
In the processes, the query image is the fingerprint measured
every time before the verification takes place. The user’s PIN
is a secret key that is used to transform the fingerprint features
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FIGURE 3. The process of Delaunay triangulation. (a) A fingerprint image
with detected minutia points. (b) A Voronoi diagram which partitions the
plane into cells. (c) Delaunay triangulation of the minutiae.
in order to generate cancelable features. Each of these steps
are detailed in the following sections.
B. DELAUNAY TRIANGULATION-BASED MATCHING
1) MINUTIAE DELAUNAY TRIANGULATION
Assume there is a fingerprint image, FI , in IR2 with a set of
minutiae points M = {mi}ni=1, as shown in Fig. 3 (a). For
∀mi ∈ M the Voronoi cell VM (i) of mi can be denoted by,
VM (i) := { q ∈ IR2| d(q,mi) ≤ d(q, p) for ∀p ∈ M} (1)
d(.) is the Euclidean distance between two points in IR2.
d(q,mi) ≤ d(q, p) represents that, for any point q in a
Voronoi cell VM (i), the Euclidean distance to the its center,
d(q,mi), is not greater than its distance to any other minutiae
p inM . The Euclidean distance between a point q(qx , qy) and
a minutia, e.g., the minutia mi(mix ,miy), can be calculated as
d(q,mi) = ‖q− mi‖
=
√
(px − mix)2 + (py − miy)2 (2)
The Voronoi Diagram VD(M ) of the minutiae set M =
{mi}ni=1 in IR
2 is the subdivision of the plane induced by
the Voronoi cells VM (i) for i = 1, 2, . . . , n (as shown
in Fig. 3 (b)). The set of vertices are denoted by VV (M ),
the set of edges by VE(M ) and the set of regions by VR(M ).
If no four points in M are co-circular, then for every vertex
v ∈ VV (M ), v is the common intersection of exactly three
edges from VE(M ) and is the incident to exactly three regions
from VR(M ). v is also the center of a circle C(v) which goes
through exactly three minutiae inM and C(v) ∩M = ∅.
A triangulation of a finite minutiae set M = {mi}ni=1 in







T∈τ V (T )
Ti ∩ Tj = V (Ti,Tj),E(Ti,Tj), or ∅
for ∀Ti,Tj ∈ τ, i 6= j
(3)
where conv(M ) is the convex hull of the minutiae set M .
T is a triangle in the collection τ with its vertices denoted
by V (T ) and edges by E(T ). The triangulation of convex hull
M is the straight-line dual of the Voronoi Diagram, VD(M ),
which is constructed by connecting any two minutiae points
in the neighboring Voronoi cell by a straight line (shown
in Fig. 3 (c)). This is a Delaunay triangulation ofM , denoted
by τDT , which will be unique if no three points from M are
collinear and no four points from M are cocircular. τDT sat-
isfies the empty circumcircle criterion, that is, there is no
minutia in the interior of the circumcircle of every triangle
in τDT . Compared to other triangulations of the minutiae
set M , the Delaunay triangulation maximizes the smallest
interior angle of triangles. If the smallest angle of a triangu-
lation, τ , is denoted by γ (τ ), then γ (τ ) ≤ γ (τDT ).
2) FINGERPRINT FEATURE REPRESENTATION
AND MATCHING
A local structure in the fingerprint image is defined as a
convex hull which consists of all triangles with a minutiae
as the common vertex, denoted by,
LS(mi) =
⋃
T (mi), ∀mi ∈ M (4)
where LS(mi) is the local structure at the minutia mi and
T (mi) is a triangle with mi as its vertex. Features of the
fingerprint image with the minutiae setM can be represented




LS(mi), mi ∈ M (5)
For LS(mi), a Cartesian coordinate system is defined to
describe coordinates of triangle features, with its origin
located at mi and its x axis aligned with the orientation of the
minutiae mi. Fig. 3 (c) shows a local structure LS(a) with the
minutia a as the common vertex. Features from the triangle
4abc which are used to represent the triangle are described
below:
– lao: the distance between the vertex a and the incircle
center o.
– αcax : the angle between the x axis and the edge ac
measured in the anti clockwise direction.
– αbax is the angle between the x axis and the edge ab
measured in the anti clockwise direction.
– βbc: the orientation difference between the minutiae
b and c.
So, features obtained from the triangle 4abc can be denoted
by f4abc = (lao, αcax , αbax , βbc). Features for the local struc-
ture LS(a) can be denoted by F(a) = {f4abc, f4acd , f4ade,
f4aef , f4afg, f4agb}. Thus, the fingerprint image can be rep-




F(mi), mi ∈ M (6)
where F(mi) is features of the local structure LS(mi) and
F(FI ) represents the features of the fingerprint FI .
A cancelable transformation is performed on the fea-
tures in order to protect the original fingerprint template.
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Ratha et al. [21] initiated three different methods to gen-
erate cancelable fingerprint templates: Cartesian, polar and
functional transformations. In order to improve system secu-
rity and performance, Wang et al. [22], [23] proposed a
few new cancelable transformation methods, such as the
partial Hadamard transform based approach [22] and the
approach based on zoned minutia pairs and partial discrete
Fourier transform (P-DFT) [23]. Based on the P-DFTmethod,
Yang et al. [24] proposed an enhanced partial discrete Fourier
transform (EP-DFT) based non-invertible transformation
algorithm which achieves a better security performance.
Kho et al. [25] proposed a cancelable design based on Partial
Local Structure (PLS) descriptor and Permutated Random-
ized Non-Negative Least Square (PR-NNLS) which has the
capability to resist against matching performance deteriora-
tion after transformation. In this paper, a polar transformation,
proposed by Ahmad et al. [26], is adopted to transform the
template.
A polar coordinate space can be divided into several polar
sectors, with L levels and S angles. The polar transforma-
tion changes the sector positions of the fingerprint template
features F(FI ), including the angle and the length of each
Delaunay triangle. If the transformation matrix for the angle
and the length features are Ms and Ml , respectively, then the
polar transformation process is denoted by,{
Ts = S +Ms
Tl = L +Ml
(7)
For instance, if S = 4,L = 1 and Ms = [1, 1,−1,−3],
the polar transformation through the matrixMs is:
Ts = S +Ms
= [1, 2, 3, 4]+ [1, 1,−1,−3]
= [2, 3, 2, 1] (8)
FIGURE 4. Fingerprint feature representation with cancelable
transformation. Features from 4abc include αcax , αbax , lao, θb and θc .
A polar transformation method transforms features in 4abc to those
in 4a1 b1 c1.
Fig. 4 shows that the 4abc in Sector 1 (S = 1) is trans-
formed to 4a1 b1 c1 in Sector 2 (S = 2). Obviously, this
mapping is a many-to-one process. After the transformation,
original features in both Sector 1 and 3 are mapped to the sec-
tor 2. Therefore, it is impossible for an adversary to abtain the
original template by inverting the transformed features, even
if the adversary knows the transformation matrices and the
transformed features. The combination of Ms and Ml is used
as the user’s PIN, that is, a secret key, to generate cancelable
fingerprint templates. If the template data is compromised,
a new template can be generated and stored in the IPS by
simply using different matrics ofMs andMl .
The matching process is performed based on the trans-
formed triangle features. For the triangle 4abc, its trans-
formed features can be denoted by f4a1 b1 c1 = (la1 o1 ,
αc1 a1 x1 , αb1 a1 x1 , βb1 c1 ). These feature values are then
quantized for the matching purpose. Suppose there is a fin-
gerprint template with a set of minutiae MT = {mi}n
T
i=1 with
features of a local structure denoted by FT (mi), and a query
with a set of minutiae MQ = {mj}n
Q
j=1 with features of a local
structure denoted by FQ(mj). If these two local structures
match one another, their local triangle features should be
the same. If there are nij matched triangles between FT (mi)





These two local structures, FT (mi) and FQ(mj), are consid-
ered to be matching one another if the similarity score, Sij,
is larger than a pre-defined threshold, thij. By comparing all
local structures between the template and the query, the num-
ber of matched local structures, nTQ, is calculated. If nTQ is
equal to or larger than a pre-defined threshold, thTQ, the query
image is considered as matching with the template stored in
the insulin pump. In this case, the fingerprint-based authen-
tication is successful and the access to the insulin pump
is permitted. Otherwise, the access to the insulin pump is
considered as malicious and is to be rejected.
C. MATCHING ALGORITHM IMPROVEMENT
As a wearable device, an insulin pump has very limited
resources in terms of computations, power and storage.
In order to conserve these resources, we propose to improve
the fingerprint matching algorithm by reducing the size of
features. The overheads that are introduced by a matching
algorithm are mainly determined by the number of features
in the template and the query fingerprint, denoted by,
O = g(nT , nQ) (10)
where O represents the overheads due to computations
and power usage, and g is a positive correlation function.
nT and nQ are the number of local structures in the template
and the query. Here the reduction of the template size is not
recommended due to following reasons: a) the template is
captured and processed before it is embedded into the pump;
b) using the whole template can ensure a high matching
accuracy of the algorithm. The steps in the improved query
generation process is outlined below:
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1) The IPS with a fingerprint scanner captures the
patient’s finger tip image, FIQ, and detects the corre-
sponding minutiae points, MQ. Thereafter, it deploys
the cancelable Delaunay Triangulation algorithm to
create local structures associated with each minu-
tia, LSQ(mi), in order to generate query features,
FQ(mi), where mi ∈ MQ.
2) The IPS then obtains the central point of the query
image by calculating the mean of x-axis and y-axis
values respectively of the minutiae in MQ, denoted by
C = mean({xmi}, {ymi}) where xmi , ymi are coordinate
values of minutiae, and mean(.) is a function to calcu-
late the mean value.
3) It then proceeds to select a subset from MQ with ns
minutiae which are spatially closest to the center C ,
denoted byMQs = {ms1 ,ms2 , . . . ,msns }. The Euclidean
distance between a minutia, m = {xm, ym}, and the
query image center,C , is calculated to determine which
minutiae lie closest to the center, denoted by d(m,C) =√
(xm − xc)2 + (ym − yc)2.
4) The query features are selected from FQ(mi), where
mi ∈ M
Q
s , denoted by F
Q
s . This query feature sub-set is
then used for the matching purpose.
According to the local structure construction in Section III,
each LS contains information of the minutiae which are sur-
rounding the center minutia of LS. So, the query FQs repre-
sents minutiae more than MQs . This guarantees the improved
matching algorithm to have reduced false acceptance rate.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS
In this section, the proposed cancelable Delaunay triangle-
based fingerprint matching algorithm is tested in order to
evaluate its overall performance in securing the insulin pump
system. The influence of the cancelable polar transformation
is also investigated in the experiments.
The publicly available fingerprint databases from the
FVC2002 DB1 and FVC2002 DB2 are used in the exper-
iments [27]. Each database has 800 gray-level fingerprint
images. They are captured from 100 different fingers with
8 images of each finger captured. Minutiae points from
each image are extracted by using the Verifinger 4.0 soft-
ware tool from the Neurotechnology [28]. The FVC2002 test
protocol [29] is adopted in the experiments.
Since the fingerprint image contains pixel information,
the quantization step for lao is set as 20 pixels. The quantiza-
tion steps for the angles αcax , αbax and βbc are defined as 5π36 .
The division angles and levels in the polar space are chosen to
be S = 8 and L = 3. The similarity threshold, thij, is defined
as 0.25.
The performance of the proposed cancelable Delaunay
triangle-based algorithm is evaluated by using the following
parameters:
1) False Rejection Rate (FRR): the ratio of failed authen-
tication attempts to the total number of attempts when
a genuine finger is used in each attempt.
2) False Acceptance Rate (FAR): the ratio of successful
authentication attempts to the total attempts when a
falsified fingerprint is applied in each attempt. This
falsified fingerprint could be from a different person’s
finger or a counterfeited fingerprint image.
3) Equal Error Rate (EER): the error rate when the FRR
equals the FAR. The optimal system performance could
be achieved when both rates are equal.
4) Genuine Acceptance Rate (GAR): the ratio of suc-
cessful genuine attempts to the total genuine attempts.
GAR equals 1-FRR.
FIGURE 5. Experimental results of the fingerprint matching algorithm
which includes the cancelable transformation process. The fingerprint
databases, FVC2002 DB1 and DB2, are used in the experiment.
Matching with cancelable transformation: The perfor-
mance of the fingerprint matching algorithm with cancelable
transformations is evaluated using both FVC2002 DB1 and
DB2 databases, with the results shown in Fig. 5. All the
features used in the experiment are extracted from Delaunay
triangles which are processed by the polar transformation
before the matching process. We can see from Fig. 5 that
the proposed cancelable fingerprint matching algorithm can
achieve a high GAR while keeping the FAR at low level. The
EER performance is 5.88% on DB1 and 3.90% on DB2.
Matching without cancelable transformation: The influ-
ence of cancelable transformation on the fingerprint match-
ing performance is investigated. Two individual experiments
are run on each fingerprint database. In each experiment,
we compare the matching performance of the algorithm
which has the process of cancelable transformation with
the algorithm which does not. The results from experi-
ments on FVC2002 DB1 are shown in Fig. 6 and those
on FVC2002 DB2 shown in Fig. 7. Their EER results are
presented in Table 1.
We can see from the results that, after the cancelable
transformation, the matching performance of the algorithm
slightly declines, with the EER on DB1 increasing from
5.38% up to 5.88% and the EER on DB2 from 2.69% up
to 3.90%. This is because the many-to-one polar mapping
may cause collision. As a result, some triangles in the print
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FIGURE 6. The comparison of matching performances on
FVC2002 DB1 between the algorithm which does not include the
cancelable transformation process and the one which has the cancelable
transformation process.
FIGURE 7. The comparison of matching performances on
FVC2002 DB2 between the algorithm which does not include the
cancelable transformation process and the one which has the cancelable
transformation process.
TABLE 1. EER experimental results on both the FVC2002 DB1 and
DB2 fingerprint databases.
not do not match after non-invertible transformation. How-
ever, with the cancelable fingerprint matching algorithm,
the overall EER can still bemaintained at around 5%,which is
within the acceptable limits. Therefore, the proposed match-
ing algorithm is efficient and can be a viable option to
protect the insulin pump from malicious access from active
adversaries.
In order to test the performance of the improved fingerprint
matching algorithm, query features associated with ns minu-
tiae which are closest to the fingerprint center are selected.
In the experiments, ns is chosen from 18 to 40, as shown in
column 1 in Table 2 and Table 3. In the table, Half Total Error
TABLE 2. Experimental results of improved Cancelable Delaunay
triangulation algorithm on FVC2002 DB1.
TABLE 3. Experimental results of improved Cancelable Delaunay
triangulation algorithm on FVC2002 DB2.
Rate (HTER), which is the mean value of FRR and FAR,
is used to assess the overall performance of the algorithm.
We can see from Table 2 that when the number of selected
local structures in query decreases, the FRR performance
goes down while the FAR goes up. It reaches the best HTER
when ns = 27. In comparison to the algorithm that uses
40 local structures in its query, in our proposed approach,
the size of the query features is reduced by 32.5%. Similarly,
in Table 3 the HTER is the smallest when ns = 23. Com-
pared to the query which uses 40 local structures, the size
of the query is decreased by 42.5%. We can therefore safely
conclude that it will not affect the overall matching perfor-
mance by reducing the size of query features. However, it can
help conserve resources in the pump and improve the energy
efficiency of the IPS.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
The current range of insulin pump products do not have
support for any rigorous authentication mechanism that can
moderate and control the access to the pump. So, by sending
a malicious request to the pump, adversaries can retrieve
private information of the patient or even change therapy
related settings in the pump. These settings decide the dosage
of insulin that will be infused into the patient’s body. Both,
an overdose or an underdose of insulin, can cause harmful
or even lethal consequences to the patient. However, with
the proposed FIPsec scheme, any user who wants to per-
form operations on the pump has to be first authenticated
by using the patient’s finger. It becomes intuitively clear
when a malicious entity who tries to unlock the pump with
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TABLE 4. Comparison of fingerprint authentication algorithms for securing an insulin pump.
the patient’s fingertip can be easily detected by the patient.
Since the adversary cannot pass the authentication process, its
communication request to the pumpwill be blocked, which in
turn protects the pump from both privacy breach and adverse
dosage attacks.
In the FIPsec scheme, the fingerprint matching algorithm
has the property of cancelability. So, an adversary cannot
reveal the patient’s fingerprint if the biometric template in
the pump is disclosed. A new template can be generated
by using a different transformation matrix and saved in the
pump for authentication. Hence, the patient’s original finger-
print template will be protected. Furthermore, the proposed
Delaunay triangle based matching algorithm can achieve
around 5% EER, which is viable in the real application
scenario, since the insulin pump has to be always worn on
the patient’s body and can be constantly monitored by the
patient. If an adversary wants to launch a brute-force attack
on the pump by continually using a forged fingerprint, it will
be easily detected by the patient. Therefore, the use of the
fingerprint based authentication scheme can protect the pump
effectively by blockingmalicious operations from adversaries
on the pump with lethal consequences.
VI. RELATED WORK
Wireless connections in insulin pump systems have triggered
cyber security concerns [7], [33]–[37]. These issues can not
only result in breaches of privacy of the patients, but also have
a potential to risk the patient’s life by delivering a lethal dose
of insulin to the patient. Therefore, the cyber security issues
have to be resolved before the next generation automated IPS
products coming out [38]. This section compares recently
proposed fingerprint authentication algorithms and analyzes
related work on the IPS security.
A. FINGERPRINT AUTHENTICATION
The design of a security scheme for the IPS needs to achieve a
trade-off between the security performance and the resource
constraints in the device, since the insulin pump is a wire-
less mobile medical device with very limited resources.
In this paper, we proposed to apply an improved cance-
lable Delaunay triangle-based fingerprint matching algorithm
to control access to the pump. Table 4 lists some of the
recent proposed fingerprint verification algorithms and high-
lights the key points if they are applied to secure an IPS,
including the state-of-the-art Minutia Cylinder-Code (MCC)
based algorithm [18] and the convolutional neural net-
works (CNNs) and deep learning based fingerprint verifica-
tion algorithm [31]. This section will compare the fingerprint
authentication algorithm designed for the IPS with each one
in the table.
The MCC-based fingerprint verification algorithm is the
state-of-the-art and can achieve an EER of less than 2% on
FVC2006 DB2. The construction of local structures (cylin-
ders) includes processes of projecting minutiae into cells
in the cylinder and calculating a numerical value of each
cell based on accumulated contributions from its neighbor-
ing minutiae. It requires mathematical computations of sig-
moid functions, euclidean distances, Gaussian functions and
others, and therefore is more complex than the construc-
tion of triangle local structures in the FIPsec scheme. Con-
sidering that the insulin pump has very limited resources
most of which have to be reserved for medical applications,
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TABLE 5. Recent research results on the insulin pump system security.
the MCC-based algorithm is not viable here. In the finger-
print verification algorithm proposed by Jin et al. [30], two
steps are required to generate fixed-length binary strings to
represent minutiae features: Polar Grid-based Three-tuple
Quantization (PGTQ) and Kernel-based Fixed-Length Trans-
formation(KFLT). The first step (PGTQ) already generates
alignment-free feature representation. However, compared
with the MCC, it requires one more step, that is, KFLT,
to generate fixed-length binary strings from the alignment-
free feature representations. So, this algorithm is not viable
to be applied on the IPS due to the computation complexity
concern in the fingerprint local structure process.
Ahmad et al. [26] proposed to use pair-polar coordinate
vectors to represent the fingerprint minutiae features. For a
fingerprint template with a minutiae set M = {mi}ni=1, each
local structure associated to a minutia has (n − 1) vectors
and each vector contains three features, including angles and
distances. However, in our proposed algorithm, each local
structure (a Delaunay triangle) is denoted by one vector with
only four feature elements in the vector, for instance, f4abc =
(lao, αcax , αbax , βbc) for 4abc in Fig. 4. So, features used to
represent each local structure in [26] are more than that in our
proposed algorithm, resulting in more resource consumption
in the pump. Furthermore, its matching performance (EER
of 6% on FVC2002 DB2 and 9% on DB1) is not as good as
our proposed algorithm which can achieve EER of 3.90% on
DB2 and 5.88% on DB1, respectively.
Lin and Kumar [31] proposed a novel fingerprint verifica-
tion algorithm built upon convolutional neural networks and
deep learning technologies. This algorithm does not require
the construction of local structures to represent the finger-
print. Nonetheless, the computation of CNNs and deep learn-
ing algorithms is heavy and thus is not suitable for wireless
medical devices. Authors used Intel i5-2500 3.3GHz CPU
and NVIDIA 980Ti GPU to perform training and testing of
the algorithm in [31]. Omar et al. [32] proposed to use finger
textures (FTs) for the verification purpose. The biometric
trait used is the FT which is the area located between the
upper phalanx and the lower knuckle of the finger, which
is not convenient for biometric capture in practice compared
with the fingerprint based biometric algorithm. Meanwhile,
the deep learning technologies are used in [32], making the
computation load of the algorithm heavy for the wireless
insulin pump.
B. IPS SECURITY
Recent IPS security research can be categorized into three
types: IPS vulnerabilities test and demonstration, IPS security
solution proposal and design, and IPS forensics, as shown
in Table 5. The summary and analysis of research in each
category is presented below:
1) IPS vulnerabilities: Recent research demonstrates that
the IPS could be attacked by using Universal Software
Radio Peripheral (USRP) [39] or a customized software
and antenna [8]. Both eavesdropping and active attacks
can be launched by the adversaries. The experiments
showed that the privacy of the patient could be breached
by the eavesdroppers, e.g., the patient ID, medical
history and therapeutic records. Furthermore, active
adversaries can send malicious commands to control
the pump and deliver lethal dose of insulin to the
patient, which may lead to medical conditions such as
hyperglycemia (high blood glucose) or hypoglycemia
(low blood glucose).
2) IPS security solution design: Currently a few
solutions have been proposed to secure the IPS.
Hei et al. [6], [41] proposed a patient infusion pat-
tern based access control scheme (PIPAC) which uses
patient infusion patterns to detect abnormal infusion
delivery in order to recover the safe infusion settings
automatically according to the pump’s logs. Its aim
is to address two types of abnormal infusion attacks:
abnormal bolus dosage attacks and abnormal basal
rate attacks. Marin et al. [42] proposed a solution that
made use of both the AES-128 in counter mode and
the AES-128 as a message authentication code (MAC)
to provide confidentiality and authentication as well.
However, theAES algorithm cannot be applied to CGM
since it is only a sensor coupled with a transmitter.
Ahmad et al. [43] proposed to use a deep learning
method to predict the dosage threshold and ask the
patient to perform gestures if the insulin to be injected
is higher than the threshold. A visible channel based
access control scheme, proposed by Zhao et al. [44],
can authenticate the doctor’s USB by transmitting the
PIN/key to the IPS via visible light signals.
3) IPS forensics: Forensic research for the IPS and med-
ical devices in general is to keep records related
to medical devices for post incident investigation.
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Benedict et al. [45] presented a case of homi-
cide in which the victim’s insulin pump was used
to inject lethal doses of etomidate and atracurium.
Henry et al. [46] proposed to integrate a new sen-
sor into the IPS in order to detect bowel sounds of
the patient for forensic analysis. This forensic infor-
mation can determine the cause of the event and
whether it is due to security breaches to the IPS or
not. Rahman et al. [47] proposed a forensically ready
system which uses drones and surveillance cameras to
record medical incidents and save them into a forensic
server located in a hospital internal network.
In this paper, we have proposed a novel IPS security
solution based on fingerprint authentication. It is lightweight
in terms of resource consumption in the insulin pump as it
does not require the pump to capture and process a real-time
fingerprint in each and every authentication attempt. It does
not rely on a key or password to be stored in every hospital.
Any doctor can gain access to the pump by using the patient’s
finger directly. It also has a strong usability as the patient can
just press his/her finger on a button on the IPS. So, it is very
useful for elderly people, especially those with dementia.
VII. CONCLUSION
Current insulin pump products lack support for rigorous
authentication mechanism to prevent malicious entities from
accessing it, and this can lead to attacks that are harmful to
the patients. Therefore, in this paper, we propose a Fingerprint
based Insulin Pump security (FIPsec) scheme which employs
a fingerprint authentication scheme to verify any access
request to the pump. With this scheme, any unauthorized
or malicious access to the pump will be instantly blocked.
A cancelable Delaunay triangle-based fingerprint matching
algorithm is presented to implement the schemewhich has the
capabilities to resist against fingerprint distortion or missing
minutiae during the capturing process. In order to conserve
resources in the insulin pump, the matching algorithm is
further improved by reducing the size of query features.
Experimental results show that this improvement does not
influence the overall matching performance but it can help
conserve the resources in the pump significantly.
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